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Lost in a Novelty Mug: U.S. Telecom, the 
FCC, and Policy Resolution for  
Net Neutrality 





This paper traces the history of net neutrality and the judicial reviews 
of the Federal Communication Commission’s multiple attempts at 
regulation, including the agency’s 2006 guidelines overturned in Comcast 
v. FCC, the 2010 rules overturned in Verizon v. FCC, and the FCC’s 
reclassification of broadband in its 2015 net neutrality rules, as well as the 
contemporary battles over the agency’s decision in November of 2017 to 
repeal the 2015 rules. As the FCC continues to wrestle with net neutrality 
and open internet regulations, the agency engaged in a series of continuing 
delays to impede a potential U.S. Supreme Court review of net neutrality in 
U.S. Telecom v. FCC. The result of the FCC’s choice to delay a review, 
especially after certiorari was denied, is that it must now defend multiple 
and contradictory visions of regulatory intent at the same time. We argue 
that the agency’s decision to delay a potential Supreme Court review 
further complicated a policy resolution to the issue of net neutrality, and in 
the process ensured that the agency will be engaged in legal battles over 
internet regulation for some time. 
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Introduction 
The social, political, and regulatory battle over net neutrality has 
become a legal quagmire for the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC). Now, more than 15 years after Columbia Law School Professor 
Tim Wu coined the term to describe network practices,1 and more than a 
decade after the FCC’s first inquiry into an Internet Service Provider’s 
(ISP) violation of the principles, the agency faces challenges in the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit over different versions of the rules, 
including a rebuke by the U.S. Senate in the form of a Congressional 
Review Act (CRA),2 as well as significant legal pressure by technology 
companies, advocacy organizations, consumers, and other interested 
parties. 
From the inception of net neutral principles by the agency in 2006, 
through the Comcast Corp. v. FCC decision,3 into a second set of 
regulations and the corresponding Verizon v. FCC decision,4 the agency 
lacked a formal delegation and jurisdiction. Then in 2015, partially at the 
direction of the D.C. Circuit, the agency reclassified broadband internet 
service under Title II,5 sparking another pair of legal challenges in U.S. 
Telecom v. FCC.6 In U.S. Telecom, the court upheld the FCC’s decision to 
reclassify broadband and apply prohibitions on ISP’s that prevented them 
from blocking, throttling, or prioritizing content.7 The decision was 
appealed to the Supreme Court, but on the same day the FCC asked the 
Court for a delay in the case, (the first of seven such requests through the 
first half of 2018), the FCC’s new chairman, Ajit Pai, released a draft 
version of an order that would repeal the agency’s 2015 Net Neutrality 
Rules.8 On November 5, 2018, the Supreme Court ultimately denied 
certiorari in the case.9 
 
 1.  Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. OF TELECOMM. & HIGH 
TECH. L. 141 (2003), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=388863. 
 2.  Jacob Kastrenakes, Senate votes to reinstate net neutrality — but it has a long way to 
go, VERGE (May 16, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/5/16/17357592/net-neutrality-
senate-vote-cra-reinstate-fcc-rules. 
 3.  Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 4.  Verizon Comm. Inc. v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 5.  Open Internet Order, 30 FCC Rcd 5601 (7), 80 FR 19737 (2015), 81 FR 93638 (2016) 
available at https://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2015/db0312/FCC-15-
24A1.pdf. 
 6.  U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Restoring Internet Freedom Order, 33 FCC Rcd 311 (1), 83 Fed, Reg, 7852 (2018), 
available at https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-releases-restoring-internet-freedom-order. 
 9.  Amy Howe, Divided court denies review in “net neutrality” cases, SCOTUSBLOG 
(Nov. 5, 2018), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/11/divided-court-denies-review-in-net-neutral 
ity-cases/. 
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This paper explores the development of net neutrality policies between 
2006-2017, as well as the court cases that have followed the agency’s 
actions at each step of the policy process. With this backdrop, this paper 
argues that the request for the initial decision to delay U.S. Telecom was an 
oversight on the FCC’s part, regardless of the Commission’s long-term 
policy intent on net neutrality. By delaying the case, the agency added 
confusion and uncertainty, as (1) state attorneys general, (2) several 
technology companies and advocacy organizations, (3) state legislatures 
and governors, (4) local mayors, and (5) the U.S. Senate all took a variety 
of actions attempting to restore net neutrality, therefore making the repeal 
increasingly complicated and problematic. Further confusion was added 
when Brett Kavanaugh was nominated to the Supreme Court because he 
had already ruled on net neutrality in the D.C. Circuit, and therefore 
recused himself from the vote, which ultimately concluded with the Court 
denying cert in the case.10 The significant amount of legal action against 
the FCC, as well as the legislative efforts, also demonstrates why the FCC 
should not have delayed the Supreme Court’s decision to grant certiorari in 
U.S. Telecom and how the agency, by doing so, has continued the uncertain 
regulatory and legal environment that has surrounded net neutrality since 
its inception. 
2005 Internet Policy Statement 
On August 5, 2005, the FCC adopted a policy statement guaranteeing 
consumers the freedom to use their internet connections to access any 
content, using any device or application.11 The statement first discussed the 
importance of the Internet, stating it has “a profound impact on American 
life” and has “fundamentally changed the way we communicate.”12 The 
FCC cited section 230(b) of the amended Communications Act of 1934, 
which included Congress’ policy to “preserve the vibrant and competitive 
free market that presently exists for the Internet” and “to promote the 
continued development of the Internet.”13 The FCC also cited Congress’ 
directive in section 706(a) of the Communications Act, which charged the 
Commission with “encourag[ing] the deployment on a reasonable and 
 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline Facilities, 
Policy Statement, 20 F.C.C.R. 14986 (2005) available at https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/ 
attachmatch/FCC-05-151A1.pdf. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012). 
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timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability . . . to all 
Americans” in the form of broadband internet service.14 
Under the guidance from these Congressional directives and “to 
ensure that broadband networks are widely deployed, open, affordable, and 
accessible to all consumers,” the FCC adopted four principles:15 
 
“To encourage broadband deployment and preserve and 
promote the open and interconnected nature of the public Internet, 
consumers are entitled to access the lawful Internet content of their 
choice.” 
“To encourage broadband deployment and preserve and 
promote the open and interconnected nature of the public Internet, 
consumers are entitled to run applications and use services of their 
choice, subject to the needs of law enforcement.” 
“To encourage broadband deployment and preserve and 
promote the open and interconnected nature of the public Internet, 
consumers are entitled to connect their choice of legal devices that 
do not harm the network.” 
“To encourage broadband deployment and preserve and 
promote the open and interconnected nature of the public Internet, 
consumers are entitled to competition among network providers, 
application and service providers, and content providers.”16 
 
The policy statement also differentiated telecommunications carriers 
from information service providers (ISPs), which were not subject to 
mandatory “common-carrier” regulation under Title II of the 
Communications Act.17 However, the FCC contended that it had authority 
to regulate the internet and ISPs under Title I, which outlines the general 
provisions and purposes of the Act.18 The FCC stated, “[t]he Commission, 
however, ‘has jurisdiction to impose additional regulatory obligations 
under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction to regulate interstate and foreign 
communications.’”19 As a result, the Commission argued that it had 
jurisdiction necessary to ensure that providers of telecommunications for 
Internet access or Internet Protocol-enabled (IP-enabled) services are 
operated in a neutral manner” (emphasis added).20 
 
 14.  47 U.S.C. § 1302(a). 
 15.  20 F.C.C.R. 14986. 
 16.  Id. (emphasis in original). 
 17.  47 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. 
 18.  Id. § 151.  
 19.  20 F.C.C.R. 14986. 
 20.  Id. 
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Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
Two years after the policy statement, in 2007, several of Comcast’s 
high-speed Internet service subscribers discovered that the company was 
interfering with their use of peer-to-peer networking applications.21 Peer-
to-peer programs allow users to exchange files with each other without 
going through a central server, though they consume large quantities of 
bandwidth. BitTorrent is an open-source, peer-to-peer networking protocol 
that has become increasingly popular among Internet users in recent 
years.22 Peer-to-peer programs, including those relying on BitTorrent, have 
become a competitive threat to cable operators such as Comcast because 
they allow Internet users to view high-quality videos that they would 
otherwise have to pay for on cable television. 
Comcast subscribers began to notice that they had problems using 
BitTorrent and similar technologies over their Comcast broadband 
connections. Due to the high volume of complaints, the Associated Press 
(AP) conducted several nationwide tests to investigate the allegations that 
Comcast was interfering with its customers’ use of peer-to-peer 
applications, including BitTorrent.23 On October 17, 2007, the AP reported 
that the tests indicated that Comcast “actively interferes with attempts by 
some of its high-speed Internet subscribers to share files online.”24 
“Comcast’s interference affects all types of content, meaning that, for 
instance, an independent movie producer who wanted to distribute his work 
using BitTorrent and his Comcast connection could find that difficult or 
impossible.”25 The AP further discovered that Comcast’s conduct had a 
“drastic effect . . . on one type of traffic—in some cases blocking it rather 
than slowing it down.”26 The AP also concluded that “the method used” by 
Comcast was “difficult to circumvent and involves [Comcast] falsifying 
network traffic.”27 
Similarly, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) published the 
results of its own testing and had come to the same conclusion: Comcast 
was selectively targeting customers who uploaded files using BitTorrent 
 
 21.  See Peter Svensson, Comcast Blocks Some Internet Traffic, ASSOC. PRESS (Oct. 19, 
2007, 6:32 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/19/AR2007 
101900842.html. 
 22.  See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline 
Facilities; Review of Regulatory Requirements for Incumbent LEC Broadband 
Telecommunications Services. 
 23.  Svensson, supra note 21. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id.  
 27.  Id. 
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and other peer-to-peer protocols.28 Following these test results, Comcast 
admitted that it targeted peer-to-peer traffic for interference. Comcast 
claimed that due to the bandwidth usage, it interfered “only during periods 
of peak network congestion” and “only . . . during periods of heavy 
network traffic.”29 
On November 1, 2007, Free Press filed a complaint with the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) against Comcast30 and asked the Commission to 
declare “that an Internet service provider violates the [Commission’s] 
Internet Policy Statement when it intentionally degrades a targeted Internet 
application.”31 Additionally, Free Press filed a petition for declaratory 
ruling asking the Commission to “clarify that an Internet service provider 
violates the FCC’s Internet Policy Statement when it intentionally degrades 
a targeted Internet application.”32 Separately, Vuze, Inc. filed a petition for 
rulemaking asking the Commission “to adopt reasonable rules that would 
prevent the network operators from engaging in practices that discriminate 
against particular Internet applications, content or technologies.”33 The 
FCC issued an Order stating that it had jurisdiction over Comcast’s 
network management practices, and that it could resolve the dispute 
through adjudication rather than through rulemaking.34 
Although Comcast complied with the Order, it appealed the Order 
based on three objections.35 First, it argued that the Commission lacked 
jurisdiction over its network management practices.36 Second, it argued that 
the Commission’s adjudicatory action was procedurally flawed because it 
circumvented the rulemaking requirements of the Administrative Procedure 
Act and violated the notice requirements of the Due Process Clause.37 
Finally, it asserted that parts of the Order are so poorly reasoned as to be 
arbitrary and capricious.38 
 
 28.  AT&T RST Packet Ex Parte, Attach. at 2. 
 29.  Letter from Mary McManus, Senior Director of FCC and Regulatory Policy, Comcast 
Corporation, to Kris A. Monteith, Chief, Enforcement Bureau, File No. EB-08-IH-1518, at 5 (Jan. 
25, 2008) (Comcast Response Letter). 
 30.  Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge against Comcast Corporation 
for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, File No. EB-08-IH-1518 (Nov. 1, 2007) (Free 
Press Complaint). 
 31.  Free Press Petition at i. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Vuze Petition at ii. 
 34.  In re Formal Compl. of Free Press & Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corp. for 
Secretly Degrading Peer–to–Peer Applications, 23 F.C.C.R. 13,028 (2008). 
 35.  Comcast Corp. v. F.C.C., 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 36.  Id. at 645. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. 
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In Comcast, the D.C. Circuit focused on whether the FCC had 
authority to regulate an ISP’s network management practices.39 
Acknowledging that it has no express statutory authority over such 
practices, the Commission relies on section 4(i) of the Communications Act 
of 1934, which authorizes the Commission to “perform any and all acts, 
make such rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent 
with this chapter, as may be necessary in the execution of its functions.”40 
Through the Communications Act of 1934, Congress gave the FCC 
express and expansive authority to regulate common carrier services, 
including landline telephony.41 In the present case, the Commission did not 
claim that Congress had given it express authority to regulate Comcast’s 
Internet services. In fact, in its 2002 Cable Modem Order, the Commission 
ruled that cable Internet service is neither a “telecommunications service” 
covered by Title II of the Communications Act nor a “cable service” 
covered by Title VI.42 Therefore, the Commission based its authority over 
Comcast’s network management practices on the broad language of section 
4(i) of the Act: “The Commission may perform any and all acts, make such 
rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this 
chapter, as may be necessary in the execution of its functions.”43 
Courts refer to the Commission’s section 4(i) power as its “ancillary” 
authority, a label that derived from three foundational Supreme Court 
decisions.44 The D.C. Circuit distilled the holdings of these three cases into 
a two-part test.45 In American Library Ass’n v. FCC, the court held: “The 
Commission . . . may exercise ancillary jurisdiction only when two 
conditions are satisfied: (1) the Commission’s general jurisdictional grant 
under Title I [of the Communications Act] covers the regulated subject and 
(2) the regulations are reasonably ancillary to the Commission’s effective 
performance of its statutorily mandated responsibilities.”46 
 
 39.  Id.  
 40.  Id. See also 47 U.S.C. § 151. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  In re High–Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, 17 F.C.C.R. 
4798, 4802, ¶ 7 (2002), aff’d, Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 
U.S. 967 (2005). 
 43.  47 U.S.C. § 154(i). Order, 23 F.C.C.R. at 13,036, ¶ 15. 
 44.  United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968), United States v. 
Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972) (Midwest Video I), and FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 
440 U.S. 689 (1979) (Midwest Video II ). All three of these cases dealt with Commission 
jurisdiction over early cable systems when similar to 2009, the Communications Act gave the 
Commission no express authority to regulate such systems. 
 45.  Comcast Corp. v. F.C.C., at 646. 
 46.  American Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 692 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
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Comcast conceded that the Commission’s action satisfied the first 
requirement because the company’s Internet service qualified as “interstate 
and foreign communication by wire” within the meaning of Title I of the 
Communications Act.47 However, the issue arose in whether the 
Commission’s action satisfied the second prong of the American Library’s 
test. Prior to considering this issue, the court considered two threshold 
arguments that the Commission raised. First, it asserted that given a 
contrary position Comcast took in a California lawsuit, the company should 
be judicially estopped from challenging the Commission’s jurisdiction over 
the company’s network management practices.48 Second, the Commission 
argued that even if Comcast’s challenge can proceed, the court does not 
need to go through the usual ancillary authority analysis because a recent 
Supreme Court decision49 provided clear reasoning that the Commission 
had authority to issue the Order. 
Courts may invoke judicial estoppel “[w]here a party assumes a 
certain position in a legal proceeding, . . . succeeds in maintaining that 
position, . . . [and then,] simply because his interests have changed, 
assume[s] a contrary position.”50 The Commission’s estoppel argument 
rested on the position Comcast took in a California case. In that case, 
Comcast claimed that the Commission had “subject matter jurisdiction” 
over its disputed network management practices.51 The Commission 
interpreted this as meaning that any action by the Commission to prohibit 
those practices would satisfy both elements of the American Library test 
and thus lie within the Commission’s ancillary authority.52 Comcast 
claimed that it never argued that the Commission could justify exercising 
ancillary authority over its network management practices. Rather, it was 
claiming that by saying the Commission had “subject matter jurisdiction” 
over those practices, it was arguing no more than what it is claiming in this 
case. 
The court agreed that both interpretations of Comcast’s California 
argument are plausible; however, Comcast’s is more so.53 Its interpretation 
comported with the overall primary jurisdiction argument it advanced in 
that case. Specifically, for an issue to fall within an agency’s primary 
 
 47.  Comcast Corp. v. F.C.C., at 646. See also 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. 
 48.  Id. at 647. 
 49.  Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
 50.  Comcast Corp. v. F.C.C., at 642. 
 51.  Id. at 647. See also Hart v. Comcast of Alameda, Inc., No. 07–6350, 2008 WL 2610787 
(N.D.Cal. June 25, 2008) (quoting Fed. Power Comm’n v. La. Power & Light Co., 406 U.S. 621, 
647, 92 S.Ct. 1827, 32 L.Ed.2d 369 (1972)). 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. 
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jurisdiction, the agency need not possess definite authority to resolve it; 
rather, there need only be “sufficient statutory support for administrative 
authority . . . that the agency should at least be requested to . . . proceed[ ]” 
in the first instance.54 Thus, the court did not interpret Comcast’s California 
argument as “inconsistent” with its argument in this case. 
The Commission’s second threshold argument was that the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Brand X “already decided the jurisdictional question 
here.”55 In that case, the Court reviewed the Commission’s 2002 Cable 
Modem Order, which removed cable Internet service from Title II and Title 
VI oversight by classifying it as an “information service.”56 Although the 
Supreme Court acknowledged that cable Internet service does contain a 
telecommunications “component,” it deferred to the Commission’s 
determination that this component is “functionally integrated” into a single 
“offering” properly classified as an “information service.”57 However, even 
if stretching the reasoning in Brand X to conclude that the Commission’s 
ancillary authority may allow it to impose some kinds of obligations on 
cable Internet providers to a claim of plenary authority over such providers, 
the Commission runs afoul of Southwestern Cable and Midwest Video I.58 
The Commission argued that the Order satisfied American Library’s 
second requirement because it is “reasonably ancillary to the Commission’s 
effective performance” of its responsibilities under several provisions of 
the Communications Act.59 However, the court held that the FCC failed to 
justify exercise of ancillary authority to regulate ISP’s network 
management practices; and that the Commission could not use its ancillary 
authority to pursue a stand-alone policy objective, rather than to support its 
exercise of a specifically delegated power.60 
2010 Open Internet Order: 
Following the Comcast decision,61 the Commission issued an order 
imposing disclosure, anti-blocking, and anti-discrimination requirements 
on broadband providers. On December 21, 2010, the FCC adopted an order 
“preserving the free and open internet,” which the Commission called an 
“important step to preserve the Internet as an open platform for innovation, 
investment, job creation, economic growth, competition, and free 
 
 54.  Id. at 648. 
 55.  Id. at 649. 
 56.  Nat’l Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., supra note 49. 
 57.  Comcast Corp. v. F.C.C., at 649. 
 58.  Id. at 650. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. 
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expression.”62 The measure, was passed 3-2 along party lines, actualized 
President Barack Obama’s campaign pledge to strengthen rules governing 
the nation’s ISPs.63 
The order followed a public process “to determine whether and what 
actions might be necessary to preserve the characteristics that have allowed 
the Internet to grow into an indispensable platform supporting our nation’s 
economy and civic life, and to foster continued investment in the physical 
networks that enable the Internet.”64 The process led to the conclusion by 
the FCC “that the Internet has thrived because of its freedom and openness 
– the absence of any gatekeeper blocking lawful uses of the network or 
picking winners and losers online.”65 Additionally, the FCC contended that 
the 100,000 comments indicated that the internet had several economic 
impacts, including “a self-reinforcing cycle of investment and innovation in 
which new uses of the network lead to increased adoption of broadband, 
which drives investment and improvements in the network itself, which in 
turn lead to further innovative uses of the network and further investment 
in content, applications, services, and devices.”66 
In the order, the FCC adopted three basic rules “[t]o provide greater 
clarity and certainty regarding the continued freedom and openness of the 
Internet.”67 The first rule was “transparency,” which requires: 
A person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access 
service shall publicly disclose accurate information regarding the network 
management practices, performance, and commercial terms of its 
broadband Internet access services sufficient for consumers to make 
informed choices regarding use of such services and for content, 
application, service, and device providers to develop, market, and maintain 
Internet offerings.68 
The FCC contended that such disclosure would “promote[] 
competition—as well as innovation, investment, end-user choice, and 
broadband adoption” by (1) “ensur[ing] that end users can make informed 
choices regarding the purchase and use of broadband service,” (2) 
increasing “end users’ confidence in broadband providers’ practices,” (3) 
“ensuring that startups and other edge providers have the technical 
 
 62.  25 F.C.C.R. 17905 (2010), available at https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attach 
match/FCC-10-201A1_Rcd.pdf. 
 63.  Sam Gustin, FCC Passes Compromise Net Neutrality Rules, WIRED (Dec. 21, 2010), 
https://www.wired.com/2010/12/fcc-order/. 
 64.  25 F.C.C.R. 17905. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. 
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information necessary to create and maintain online content, applications, 
services, and devices, and to assess the risks and benefits of embarking on 
new projects,” (4) increasing “the likelihood that broadband providers will 
abide by open Internet principles,” and (5) “enabl[ing] the Commission to 
collect information necessary to assess, report on, and enforce the other 
open Internet rules.”69 
The second rule prohibits ISPs from “blocking” content or access. The 
rule states, “[a] person engaged in the provision of fixed broadband Internet 
access service, insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not block lawful 
content, applications, services, or nonharmful devices, subject to 
reasonable network management.”70 
The final rule prohibits “unreasonable discrimination in transmitting 
lawful network traffic.”71 The rule provides that “[a] person engaged in the 
provision of fixed broadband Internet access service, insofar as such person 
is so engaged, shall not unreasonably discriminate in transmitting lawful 
network traffic over a consumer’s broadband Internet access service. 
Reasonable network management shall not constitute unreasonable 
discrimination.”72 
The FCC provided several factors to determine whether the 
discrimination is reasonable or not. In terms of transparency, the FCC 
explained that increased transparency makes differential treatment more 
likely to be reasonable. Regarding end-user control, the FCC contended 
that “enabling end users to choose among different broadband offerings . . . 
would be unlikely to violate the no unreasonable discrimination rule.”73 
Furthermore, discriminating based on “specific uses of a network” or the 
“classes of uses” is likely unreasonable, according to the FCC.74 
The FCC wrote in the order that “the types of practices [it] would be 
concerned about include, but are not limited to, discrimination that harms 
an actual or potential competitor to the broadband provider, that harms end 
users, or that impairs free expression.”75 The FCC added that a network 
management practice “is reasonable if it is appropriate and tailored to 
achieving a legitimate network management purpose, taking into account 
the particular network architecture and technology of the broadband 
Internet access service.”76 Legitimate purposes include, “ensuring network 
 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. 
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security and integrity, including by addressing traffic that is harmful to the 
network; addressing traffic that is unwanted by end users[;] . . . and 
reducing or mitigating the effects of congestion on the network.”77 
The FCC applied the new open internet rules to “broadband Internet 
access service,” which it defined as: 
A mass-market retail service by wire or radio that provides the 
capability to transmit data to and receive data from all or substantially all 
Internet endpoints, including any capabilities that are incidental to and 
enable the operation of the communications service, but excluding dial-up 
Internet access service. This term also encompasses any service that the 
Commission finds to be providing a functional equivalent of the service 
described in the previous sentence, or that is used to evade the protections 
set forth in this Part.78 
The FCC did not apply the rules to “premise operators,” including 
coffee shops, bookstores, airlines, and other entities when they acquire 
Internet service from a broadband provider to enable their patrons to access 
the Internet from their establishments,” or to “dial-up Internet access 
service” because “the underlying dial-up Internet access service is subject 
to protections under Title II of the Communications Act.”79 Additionally, 
the FCC did not include mobile broadband as part of the new rules, citing 
that it “presents special considerations that suggest differences in how and 
when open Internet protections should apply.”80 
The order cited elements of the 1996 Telecommunications Act and the 
Communications Act as its authority to adopt the Open Internet Rules. 
First, the FCC cited section 706(a),81 which directed the Commission to 
take actions that encourage the deployment of “advanced 
telecommunications capability.”82 The section also required that the FCC 
encourage such deployment by “utilizing, in a manner consistent with the 
public interest, convenience, and necessity,” various tools including 
“measures that promote competition in the local telecommunications 
market, or other regulating methods that remove barriers to infrastructure 
investment.”83 The FCC contended that in Comcast, the D.C. Circuit had 
identified section 706(a) as a provision that “at least arguably . . . 
 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. (“In addition, existing mobile networks present operational constraints that fixed 
broadband networks do not typically encounter. This puts greater pressure on the concept of 
‘reasonable network management’ for mobile providers, and creates additional challenges in 
applying a broader set of rules to mobile at this time.”). 
 81.  Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. LA. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996). 
 82.  25 F.C.C.R. 17905. 
 83.  Id. 
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delegate[s] regulatory authority to the Commission,” and in fact “contain[s] 
a direct mandate—the Commission ‘shall encourage.’”84 
Second, the order cited Title II of the Communications Act,85 which 
delegates to the Commission “express and expansive authority” to ensure 
that the “charges [and] practices . . . in connection with” 
telecommunications services are “just and reasonable.” Finally, the order 
cited Titles III and VI, which provide the FCC jurisdiction over video and 
audio services, and, according to the FCC, additional authority for open 
Internet rules.86 
The order also addressed the First Amendment concerns raised by 
several broadband providers who argued that “open Internet rules are 
inconsistent with the . . . First Amendment . . . because broadband 
providers distribute their own and third-party content to customers, 
[making] speakers entitled to First Amendment protections.”87 The FCC 
pushed back, contending that broadband providers typically are best 
described not as “speakers,” but rather as conduits for speech. The 
Commission further argued that broadband Internet access service “does 
not involve an exercise of editorial discretion,” finding that it is comparable 
to cable companies’ determination of which stations or programs to include 
as part of their service.88 The FCC further asserted that even if their new 
rules implicated speech activity, they would not violate the First 
Amendment because they would pass intermediate scrutiny, which 
provides that a content-neutral regulation will be sustained if “it furthers an 
important or substantial government interest . . . unrelated to the 
suppression of free expression,” and if “the means chosen” to achieve that 
interest “do not burden substantially more speech than is necessary.”89 The 
FCC contended that it had such an interest, namely that “preserving an 
open Internet to encourage competition and remove impediments to 
infrastructure investment while enabling consumer choice, end-user 
control, free expression, and the freedom to innovate without 
permission.”90 
 
 84.  47 U.S.C. § 1302(a). See also Comcast Corp. v. F.C.C., at 648. 
 85.  47 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. 
 86.  47 U.S.C. 301 et seq.; 47 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. 
 87.  25 F.C.C.R. 17905. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. 
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Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
Following the FCC’s 2010 Open Internet Order,91 Verizon filed 
petition for judicial review as well as notice of appeal,92 marking the 
second time in less than five years in which the D.C. Circuit was 
confronted with an FCC effort to compel broadband providers to treat all 
Internet traffic the same regardless of source.93 
As discussed in the 2010 order, the Commission claimed that section 
706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 vested it with affirmative 
authority to enact measures encouraging the deployment of broadband 
infrastructure.94 The court held that the Commission had reasonably 
interpreted section 706 to empower it to promulgate rules governing 
broadband providers’ treatment of Internet traffic.95 However, the 
Commission had chosen to classify broadband providers in a manner that 
exempts them from treatment as common carriers, and the 
Communications Act expressly prohibits the Commission from regulating 
them as such. Therefore, the Commission had failed to establish that the 
anti-discrimination and anti-blocking rules do not impose per se common 
carrier obligations, and those portions of the Open Internet Order were 
vacated. 
The court stated that they were not reviewing the “wisdom” of the 
Open Internet Order, but determining whether the Commission had 
demonstrated that the regulations fall within the scope of its statutory grant 
of authority.96 The court stated that the Telecommunications Act of 1966 
granted regulatory authority to the FCC and empowered it to promulgate 
rules governing broadband providers’ treatment of Internet traffic, 
including preserving and facilitating “virtuous circle” of innovation that 
had driven explosive growth of Internet.97 However, the FCC was limited 
by its subject matter jurisdiction and the requirement that any regulation be 
tailored to specific statutory goal of accelerating broadband deployment.98 
Verizon claimed that neither subsection (a) nor (b) of section 706 
conferred any regulatory authority on the Commission. It also claimed that 
even if the provisions granted the Commission substantive authority, the 
scope of that authority did not permit the Commission to regulate 
 
 91.  In the Matter of Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Indus. Practices, 25 F.C.C. 
Rcd. 17905, 17905 (2010). 
 92.  Verizon, 740 F.3d at 623. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. at 635. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. 
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broadband providers in the manner that the Open Internet Order rules did.99 
The court had stated that a Chevron deference was warranted even if the 
agency had interpreted a statutory provision that could be said to delineate 
the scope of the agency’s jurisdiction.100 
Here, the Commission has made an argument similar to that in 
Comcast, that section 706(a) granted it authority to regulate broadband 
providers.101 However, the court held that the provision “does not constitute 
an independent grant of authority.”102 The court stated that the Commission 
is not bound forever by the strict interpretation of section 706(a). 
Nevertheless, the agency must acknowledge and explain the reasons for a 
changed interpretation.103 Which the Commission failed to do in Comcast. 
However, the court concluded that in this case the Commission’s current 
understanding of section 706(a) as a grant of regulatory authority 
represented a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute.104 
Additionally, the court held that the Commission had authority under the 
Telecommunications Act to take steps to accelerate broadband deployment 
if and when it determined that such broadband deployment is not 
“reasonable and timely.”105 
Verizon’s claim that neither subsection (a) nor (b) of section 706 
conferred any regulatory authority on the Commission, and that even if it 
did the Open Internet Order fell beyond that scope, was rejected. The court 
held that the Commission could compel fixed broadband providers under 
the Telecommunications Act to adhere to open network management 
practices that would meaningfully promote broadband deployment.106 
The court also concluded that prediction by the Commission that 
regulations compelling fixed broadband providers under the 
Telecommunications Act to adhere to open network management practices 
would encourage broadband deployment, was rational and supported by 
substantial evidence.107 Additionally, the court held that the order 
compelling broadband providers under the Telecommunications Act to 
adhere to open network management practices could constitute common 
carriage per se with respect to edge providers.108 The court went on to 
 
 99.  Id.  
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 649. 
 102.  Id. at 658. 
 103.  Verizon, 740 F.3d at 636. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. at 643. 
 107.  Id. at 644. 
 108.  Id. at 655. 
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conclude that the anti-discrimination obligation imposed on fixed 
broadband providers has “relegated [those providers], pro tanto, to 
common carrier status,”109 in violation of the Communications Act. Also, 
the Commission’s anti-blocking rules could not be sustained for lack of 
meritorious argument in order or in briefs before court. 
Verizon argued that the disclosure rules were not severable, and that if 
the anti-discrimination and anti-blocking rules failed, the disclosure 
requirement must as well.110 The court rejected their argument stating that 
the disclosure rules were severable. The court then vacated and remanded 
the anti-discrimination and the anti-blocking rules.111 
2015 Open Internet Order: 
Following the Verizon ruling, and following several of the court’s 
recommendations, in February 2015, the FCC adopted the 2015 Open 
Internet Order, titled “Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet.”112 The 
Commission reasoned that it had been “committed to protecting and 
promoting an open Internet.”113 The FCC added: 
The open Internet drives the American economy and serves, every 
day, as a critical tool for America’s citizens to conduct commerce, 
communicate, educate, entertain, and engage in the world around them . . . 
[b]ut it must remain open: open for commerce, innovation, and speech; 
open for consumers and for the innovation created by applications 
developers and content companies; and open for expansion and investment 
by America’s broadband providers.114 
The vote to adopt the proposed rules passed along party lines with the 
three Democratic-appointed commissioners voting in favor and the two 
Republican-appointed commissioners, Ajit Pai and Michael O’Rielly, 
voting against.115 
Citing the Verizon decision,116 the FCC asserted that section 706 
afforded the Commission substantive authority under which it could adopt 
open Internet protections. However, in order to rely on section 706, the 
FCC was required by the D.C. Circuit in Verizon to change the 
 
 109.  Id. at 656 (citing F.C.C. v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979)). 
 110.  Verizon, 740 F.3d at 659. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 5. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Bill Chappell, FCC Approves Net Neutrality Rules For ‘Open Internet’, NPR (Feb. 26, 
2015), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/02/26/389259382/net-neutrality-up-for-
vote-today-by-fcc-board. 
 116.  Verizon, 740 F.3d at 623. 
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classification of broadband providers as a “telecommunications service,” 
therefore classifying it under Title II.117 
The Open Internet Order enforced net neutrality through a variety of 
provisions, including three “bright-line” rules prohibiting ISPs from 
blocking and throttling lawful internet content, as well as prohibiting paid 
prioritization for internet content delivery, which would allow ISPs to favor 
some internet traffic over others.118 The rule against blocking echoed the 
2010 order, stating that “[a] person engaged in the provision of broadband 
Internet access service, insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not 
block lawful content, applications, services, or non-harmful devices, 
subject to reasonable network management.”119 The 2015 order also 
reaffirmed the transparency rule in the 2010 order.120 
However, the FCC added a separate rule in 2015 against throttling or 
the “degradation targeted at specific uses of a customer’s broadband 
connection.”121 The rule provided that “[a] person engaged in the provision 
of broadband Internet access service, insofar as such person is so engaged, 
shall not impair or degrade lawful Internet traffic on the basis of Internet 
content, application, or service, or use of a non-harmful device, subject to 
reasonable network management.”122 
Finally, the FCC adopted a rule against paid prioritization, which 
occurs “when a broadband provider accepts payment (monetary or 
otherwise) to manage its network in a way that benefits particular content, 
applications, services, or devices.”123 The rule stated: 
A person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access 
service, insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not engage in paid 
prioritization. “Paid prioritization” refers to the management of a 
broadband provider’s network to directly or indirectly favor some traffic 
over other traffic, including through use of techniques such as traffic 
shaping, prioritization, resource reservation, or other forms of preferential 
traffic management, either (a) in exchange for consideration (monetary or 
otherwise) from a third party, or (b) to benefit an affiliated entity.124 
 
 117.  Id.; 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 5 (“Taking the Verizon decision’s implicit 
invitation, we revisit the Commission’s classification of the retail broadband Internet access 
service as an information service and clarify that this service encompasses the so-called ‘edge 
service.’”). 
 118.  2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 5. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id. 
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However, the order did include a waiver for paid prioritization, a 
balancing test providing that the FCC “may waive the ban on paid 
prioritization only if the petitioner demonstrates that the practice would 
provide some significant public interest benefit and would not harm the 
open nature of the Internet.”125 
The 2015 order, unlike the 2010 rules, included mobile broadband 
under the new rules. The order “update[d] the definition of public switched 
network to reflect current technology, by including services that use public 
IP addresses.”126 Additionally, the FCC included mobile broadband 
services under its Title III authority “to protect the public interest through 
the management of spectrum licensing.”127 
United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674 
(D.C. Cir. 2016) 
After the FCC issued the 2015 order, ISPs and industry associations 
petitioned for review in the D.C. Circuit. The Commission contended that it 
was justified in reclassifying broadband internet service as 
telecommunications service subject to common carrier regulation under 
Title II of the Communications Act, citing the Verizon ruling.128 The court 
agreed in the current action with the Commission’s argument that 
consumers’ perceive broadband internet service as a standalone offering 
since consumers generally relied on broadband service to access third-party 
content.129 
Conversely, U.S. Telecom argued that the Commission violated 
section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act, which requires that a 
notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) “include . . . either the terms or 
substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues 
involved.”130 According to U.S. Telecom, the Commission violated this 
requirement because the NPRM proposed relied on section 706, not Title 
II.131 The court rejected its argument stating that the Commission’s NPRM 
satisfied the test for validity of its final decision of reclassifying broadband 
service.132 
U.S. Telecom went on to argue that the Commission lacked good 
reasons for reclassifying broadband because it could have “adopted 
 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  United States Telecom, 825 F.3d at 698; Verizon, 740 F.3d at 623. 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3). 
 131.  United States Telecom, 825 F.3d at 700. 
 132.  Id. 
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appropriate Open Internet rules based upon [section] 706 without 
reclassifying broadband.”133 Again, the court rejected its argument stating 
that the Commission provided valid reason for changing its policy and 
reclassifying broadband service as telecommunications.134 The 
Commission had argued that it would not have been able to adopt 
appropriate “net neutrality” rules under the Telecommunications Act 
without reclassifying broadband service.135 
In addition to its first argument, U.S. Telecom claimed that the NPRM 
provided inadequate notice that the Commission would regulate 
interconnection arrangements under Title II.136 However, as stated above, 
the court held that the NPRM provided adequate notice when it “expressly 
ask[s] for comments on a particular issue or otherwise ma[kes] clear that 
the agency [is] contemplating a particular change.”137 
The court also held that the Commission reasonably reclassified 
mobile broadband service as a commercial mobile service because “Mobile 
broadband is a ‘mobile service’; it ‘is provided for profit’; and it is 
available ‘to the public’ or ‘a substantial portion of the public.’”138 
Additionally, the court held that any deficiency in the Commission’s 
NPRM was harmless with respect to the Commission’s redefinition of term 
“public switched network.”139 
Full Service Network argued that the NPRM violated the APA’s 
notice requirement because it nowhere identified the rules from which the 
Commission later decided to forbear.140 The court rejected this argument 
holding that the NPRM provided adequate notice of rules from which the 
Commission likely would not forbear.141 
Full Service Network also challenged the Commission’s finding that 
“the availability of other protections adequately addresses commenters’ 
concerns about forbearance from the interconnection provisions under the 
section 251/252 framework.”142 The court concluded that commenters’ 
concerns were adequately addressed, and that the Commission had 
 
 133.  Id. at 707. 
 134.  Id.  
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Id. at 712. 
 137.  Id. (citing CSX Transp., Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 584 F.3d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). 
 138.  United States Telecom, 825 F.3d at 714. 
 139.  Id. at 725.  
 140.  Id. at 727. 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  2015 Open Internet Order, 30 FCC Rcd. at 5849–50 ¶ 51. 
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authority to regulate network connections.143 Furthermore, broadband 
service was within the Commission’s jurisdiction as interstate service. 
The court held that commenters’ concerns about the FCC’s decision to 
forbear from applying mandatory network connection and facilities 
unbundling requirements as part of actions to promote open internet, or 
“net neutrality,” were adequately addressed, where FCC had authority to 
regulate network connections, broadband service fell within FCC’s 
jurisdiction as interstate service, and FCC had no obligation to determine 
legal status of each underlying hypothetical regulatory obligation prior to 
undertaking forbearance analysis. 
US Telecom claimed that the NPRM provided inadequate notice that 
the Commission would issue a General Conduct Rule.144 The court held 
that the Commission provided adequate notice that its “net neutrality” rules 
would issue general conduct rules prohibiting broadband internet providers 
from unreasonably interfering with end users’ access to lawful content.145 
U.S. Telecom went on to argue that the NPRM violated the Due 
Process Clause which “requires the invalidation of laws [or regulations] 
that are impermissibly vague.”146 The court ruled that the Commission’s 
general conduct rules were not impermissibly vague, and thus did not 
violate the Due Process Clause.147 
Alamo argued that the open internet rules violated the First 
Amendment by forcing broadband providers to transmit speech with which 
they might disagree.148 The court rejects this argument stating that 
“Common carriers have long been subject to nondiscrimination and equal 
access obligations akin to those imposed by the rules without raising any 
First Amendment question.”149 Therefore, the new rules did not force 
broadband providers to transmit speech with which they might disagree in 
violation of the First Amendment. 
On May 1, 2017, the D.C. Circuit denied petitions for en banc review 
of U.S. Telecom v. FCC, finding that such a review “would be particularly 
unwarranted at this point in light of the uncertainty surrounding the fate of 
the FCC’s Order.”150 Judge Brett Kavanaugh, who was nominated by 
President Donald Trump to fill the vacant seat on the U.S. Supreme Court 
left by Justice Anthony Kennedy, wrote a dissenting opinion. He found that 
 
 143.  United States Telecom, 825 F.3d at 729. 
 144.  Id. at 735.  
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. at 734. 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  Id. at 740. 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
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although the 2015 order “is one of the most consequential regulations ever 
issued by any executive or independent agency in the history of the United 
States[,] . . . [it] is unlawful and must be vacated, however, for two 
alternative and independent reasons.151 
First, Kavanaugh asserted that Congress “did not clearly authorize the 
FCC to issue the net neutrality rule” because it “has never enacted net 
neutrality legislation or clearly authorized the FCC to impose common- 
carrier obligations on Internet service providers.”152 He added that the FCC 
needed “clear congressional authorization,” which was not provided by the 
1934 Communications Act.153 
Second, Kavanaugh argued that the 2015 order violated the First 
Amendment. He cited Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC (1994)154 
and Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, (1997)155 as evidence that 
the First Amendment “bars the Government from restricting the editorial 
discretion of Internet service providers, absent a showing that an Internet 
service provider possesses market power in a relevant geographic 
market.”156 Kavanaugh contended that the FCC, in this case, had “not even 
tried to make a market power showing.”157 He added, “The rule transforms 
the Internet by imposing common-carrier obligations on Internet service 
providers and thereby prohibiting Internet service providers from 
exercising editorial control over the content they transmit to consumers.” 
Conversely, the majority previously held in its 2016 ruling in U.S. Telecom 
v. FCC that “Common carriers have long been subject to nondiscrimination 
and equal access obligations akin to those imposed by the rules without 
raising any First Amendment question.”158 
In total, including after the nomination of Kavanaugh, the FCC 
requested seven delays159 to respond to the appeal, and thus the agency 
 
 151.  Id. at 417. 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994). 
 155.  Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997). 
 156.  United States Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 418. 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  United States Telecom, 825 F.3d at 740. 
 159.  United States Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d 674, appeal docketed, No. 17-504 (2017). See 
also Letter from Noel J. Francisco, U.S. Solicitor General, to Honorable Scott S. Harris, U.S. 
Supreme Court Clerk (Nov. 22, 2017), available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/Docket 
PDF/17/17-504/21360/20171122164513445_Extension%20Letter%2017-504.pdf; Letter from 
Noel J. Francisco, U.S. Solicitor General, to Honorable Scott S. Harris, U.S. Supreme Court 
Clerk (Dec. 18, 2017), available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17-504/24331/ 
20171218170915732_Extension%20Letter%2017-498%20et%20al.%20%203rd.pdf; Letter from 
Noel J. Francisco, U.S. Solicitor General, to Honorable Scott S. Harris, U.S. Supreme Court 
Clerk (Jan. 19, 2018), available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17-504/28587/ 
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delayed the Supreme Court’s decision of whether it would hear the case. 
However, on November 5, 2018, the Supreme Court denied certiorari, 
leaving the D.C. Circuit ruling in place.160 
Because Kavanaugh was nominated to serve on the U.S. Supreme 
Court, and was eventually sworn in, the FCC further complicated net 
neutrality by delaying the petition for cert. Kavanaugh, because he already 
ruled on the case, recused himself from the decision to grant cert.161 
Observers speculated that Chief Justice John Roberts recused himself 
because he owned stock in Time Warner, a company now owned by AT&T 
that was challenging the new net neutrality rules.162 Thus, the issue, rather 
than being potentially resolved by a nine-judge panel before Justice 
Kennedy retired, remains quite complicated, especially for the FCC, which 
faces a D.C. Circuit ruling that favored the previous net neutrality rules. 
2017 Restoring Internet Freedom Order 
Amidst the FCC’s repeated successful attempts to delay the Supreme 
Court’s response to the US Telecom case, on December 14, 2017, the 
Commission, voted 3-2 along party lines to repeal its net neutrality rules in 
a Declaratory Ruling, a Report and Order, and an Order tilted “Restoring 
 
20180119205119723_Extension%20Letter%20FCC.pdf; Letter from Noel J. Francisco, U.S. 
Solicitor General, to Honorable Scott S. Harris, U.S. Supreme Court Clerk (March 2, 2018), 
available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17-504/37496/20180302173433022_ 
Extension%20letter%2017-498%20et%20al%205th.pdf; Letter from Noel J. Francisco, U.S. 
Solicitor General, to Honorable Scott S. Harris, U.S. Supreme Court Clerk (March 30, 2018), 
available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17-504/41801/20180330151236886_ 
Extension%20Letter%2017-498%20through%2017-504.pdf; Letter from Noel J. Francisco, U.S. 
Solicitor General, to Honorable Scott S. Harris, U.S. Supreme Court Clerk (April 27, 2018), 
available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17-504/44943/20180427164329429_ 
Extension%20Letter%2017-498%20-%2017-17-504%20%207th.pdf; Letter from Noel J. 
Francisco, U.S. Solicitor General, to Honorable Scott S. Harris, U.S. Supreme Court Clerk (May 
30, 2018), available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17-504/48612/201805 
30110336121_Extension%20Letter%2017-498%20%20-%2017-504%208th.pdf. 
 160.  Howe, supra note 9. 
 161.  Id. (“With Roberts and Kavanaugh both recused, that left only seven justices. Justices 
Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito and Neil Gorsuch indicated that they would have opted for 
Munsingwear vacatur, which would have left the D.C. Circuit’s ruling without any precedential 
value. But they would have needed at least one more vote for that result, which they were 
apparently not able to get with Roberts and Kavanaugh recused.”). 
 162.  Id. (“The court’s newest justice, Brett Kavanaugh, was expected to recuse himself from 
voting on the petitions because he had participated in the cases while on the D.C. Circuit, and he 
did. But Chief Justice John Roberts also recused himself—presumably (although there is no way 
to know for sure) because he owns stock in one of the companies challenging the rules.”). See 
also Brian Fung, The Supreme Court won’t take up net neutrality, WASH. POST (Nov. 5, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/11/05/supreme-court-wont-take-up-net-neutra 
lity-this-time/?utm_term=.34cd6a5a0336. 
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Internet Freedom.”163 FCC Chairman Ajit Pai, Commissioner Brendan 
Carr, and Commissioner Mike O’Reilly voted in favor of repeal while 
Commissioners Mignon Clyburn and Jessica Rosenworcel were opposed. 
The order contended that its purpose was to “reverse the Commission’s 
abrupt shift [in 2015] to heavy-handed utility-style regulation of broadband 
Internet access service and return to the light-touch framework under which 
a free and open Internet underwent rapid and unprecedented growth for 
almost two decades.”164 
The Order first “[r]estor[ed] the classification of broadband Internet 
access service as an ‘information service’” as it had been classified prior to 
the 2015 Open Internet Order.165 In so doing, the FCC argued, it would 
“end utility style regulation of the Internet in favor of the market-based 
policies necessary to preserve the future of Internet freedom.”166 The FCC 
further argued that reclassification would allow for “light-touch” regulation 
meant to “promote investment and innovation better than applying costly 
and restrictive laws of a bygone era to broadband Internet access 
service.”167 Additionally, the order reinstated the private mobile service 
classification of mobile broadband Internet access service. The FCC 
contended that “Congress intended the definition of ‘telecommunications 
service’ to include commercial mobile service.”168 
Second, the Order “[adopted] transparency requirements that ISPs 
disclose information about their practices to consumers, entrepreneurs, and 
the Commission.”169 The new rule, modifying the 2010 Open Internet 
Order rule by eliminating “many of the burdensome additional reporting 
obligations” stated: 
Any person providing broadband Internet access service shall 
publicly disclose accurate information regarding the network 
management practices, performance, and commercial terms of its 
broadband Internet access services sufficient to enable consumers 
to make informed choices regarding the purchase and use of such 
services and entrepreneurs and other small businesses to develop, 
market, and maintain Internet offerings. Such disclosure shall be 
made via a publicly available, easily accessible website or through 
transmittal to the Commission.170 
 
 163.  Restoring Internet Freedom Order, supra note 8. 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Id. 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  Id. 
 169.  Id. 
 170.  Id. 
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More specifically, the new ruled required ISPs to disclose several 
network practices, including instances of “blocking,”171 “throttling,”172 
“affiliated prioritization,”173 “paid prioritization,”174 “congestion 
management,”175 “application-specific behavior,”176 “device attachment 
rules,”177 and “security.”178 The order also required disclosure of certain 
“performance characteristics” and “commercial terms of service,” 
including price, privacy policies, and redress options. 
The FCC contended that increased transparency would allow 
consumers to “choose what works best for them,” rather than having the 
government make such a determination. In other words, according to the 
FCC, the new rule was meant to “ensure that consumers have the 
information necessary to make informed choices about the purchase and 
use of broadband Internet access service, which promotes a competitive 
marketplace for those services.”179 
Finally, the FCC eliminated its conduct rules for ISPs, including the 
bright-line rules preventing blocking, throttling, and paid prioritization. The 
FCC provided three reasons for eliminating the conduct rules, including 
that the transparency rule “obviates the need for conduct rules by achieving 
comparable benefits at lower cost,” that the costs of such rules – decreasing 
 
 171.  Restoring Internet Freedom Order, supra note 8 (“Any practice (other than reasonable 
network management elsewhere disclosed) that blocks or otherwise prevents end user access to 
lawful content, applications, service, or non-harmful devices, including a description of what is 
blocked.”). 
 172.  Id. (“Any practice (other than reasonable network management elsewhere disclosed) 
that degrades or impairs access to lawful Internet traffic on the basis of content, application, 
service, user, or use of a non-harmful device, including a description of what is throttled.”). 
 173.  Id. (“Any practice that directly or indirectly favors some traffic over other traffic, 
including through use of techniques such as traffic shaping, prioritization, or resource reservation, 
to benefit an affiliate, including identification of the affiliate.”). 
 174.  Id. (“Any practice that directly or indirectly favors some traffic over other traffic, 
including through use of techniques such as traffic shaping, prioritization, or resource reservation, 
in exchange for consideration, monetary or otherwise.”). 
 175.  Id. (“These descriptions should include the types of traffic subject to the practices; the 
purposes served by the practices; the practices’ effects on end users’ experience; criteria used in 
practices, such as indicators of congestion that trigger a practice, including any usage limits 
triggering the practice, and the typical frequency of congestion; usage limits and the 
consequences of exceeding them; and references to engineering standards, where appropriate.”). 
 176.  Id. (“Whether and why the ISP blocks or rate-controls specific protocols or protocol 
ports, modifies protocol fields in ways not prescribed by the protocol standard, or otherwise 
inhibits or favors certain applications or classes of applications.”). 
 177.  Id. (“Any restrictions on the types of devices and any approval procedures for devices 
to connect to the network.”). 
 178.  Id. (“Any practices used to ensure end-user security or security of the network, 
including types of triggering conditions that cause a mechanism to be invoked (but excluding 
information that could reasonably be used to circumvent network security).”). 
 179.  Restoring Internet Freedom Order, supra note 8. 
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of innovation and investment – outweighed any benefits, and “the record 
does not identify any legal authority to adopt conduct rules for all ISPs, and 
we decline to distort the market with a patchwork of non-uniform, limited-
purpose rules.”180 
Regarding paid prioritization, the FCC asserted that the elimination of 
the rule “will help spur innovation and experimentation, encourage network 
investment, and better allocate the costs of infrastructure, likely benefiting 
consumers and competition.”181 Turning to blocking and throttling, the 
FCC maintained that it “do[es] not support blocking lawful content, 
consistent with long-standing Commission policy.”182 However, the 
Commission argued that there was “scant evidence that end users, under 
different legal frameworks, have been prevented by blocking or throttling 
from accessing the content of their choosing” and that there were no 
“actual incidents” that implicated free speech. 
Furthermore, the FCC contended that the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC), through its authority over unfair and deceptive practices,183 already 
had “significant experience protecting against the harms to competition and 
to consumers that the [conduct rules] purport[ed] to reach.”184 Thus, the 
FCC contended that the FTC already provides the appropriate flexibility 
and predictability to protect consumers and competition and addresses new 
practices that might develop with less harm to innovation. 
Over two months after the vote, on Feb. 22, 2018, the FCC made the 
repeal of net neutrality official by publishing the new rules in the Federal 
Register.185 Although minor portions took effect on April 23, several 
provisions did not.186 After OMB review, the remaining portions of the 
 
 180.  Id. 
 181.  Id. 
 182.  Id. 
 183.  15 U.S.C § 45. 
 184.  Restoring Internet Freedom Order, supra note 8. 
 185.  Marguerite Reardon, FCC officially publishes net neutrality repeal, CNET (Feb. 22, 
2018), https://www.cnet.com/news/fcc-officially-publish-net-neutrality-repeal/. See also Devin 
Coldewey, The FCC’s order gutting net neutrality is now official – but the fight is just getting 
started, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 22, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/02/22/the-fccs-order-
gutting-net-neutrality-is-now-official-but-the-fight-is-just-getting-started/.  
 186.  Benny Evangelista, Net Neutrality Repeal Published in Federal Register, GOV’T. TECH. 
(Feb. 22, 2018), http://www.govtech.com/network/Net-Neutrality-Repeal-Published-in-Federal-
Register.html. See also Jon Brodkin, Ajit Pai hasn’t finalized net neutrality repeal – here’s a 
theory on why, ARS TECHNICA (April 24, 2018), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2018/04/fcc-
hasnt-finalized-net-neutrality-repeal-and-the-delay-might-be-strategic/; Karl Bode, No, Net 
Neutrality Isn’t Officially Dead (Yet), And The FCC Is Stalling For A Reason, TECHDIRT (April 
25, 2018), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20180424/08295039699/no-net-neutrality-isnt-offici 
ally-dead-yet-fcc-is-stalling-reason.shtml. 
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2017 order went into legal effect on June 11, 2018 with several challenges 
to the rule changes pending in the DC Circuit. 
Legal Challenges, Legislation Following the FCC’s 2017 Order 
Following the passage of the 2017 Order, and the publication of the 
new rules in the Federal Register on Feb. 22, 2018, (1) state attorneys 
general, (2) several technology companies and advocacy organizations, (3) 
state legislatures and governors, (4) local mayors, and (5) the U.S. Senate 
all took a variety of actions attempting to restore net neutrality, making the 
repeal increasingly complicated and problematic. The significant amount of 
legal action against the FCC, as well as the legislative efforts, further 
demonstrate why the FCC should not have delayed the Supreme Court’s 
decision to grant certiorari in US Telecom. 
Lawsuits Against the FCC 
Following the repeal of net neutrality, and again following the 
publication of the new rules in the Federal Register, 23 state attorneys 
general, as well as several companies and organizations, filed petitions for 
review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in an attempt to 
block the repeal of net neutrality and the enforcement of the 2017 
Restoring Internet Freedom Order. 
On February 22, twenty-two state attorneys general187 and the attorney 
general of Washington, D.C. formally re-filed their petition for review in 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit against the 
FCC after the Commission published the new rules in the Federal 
Register.188 The attorneys general asked the D.C. Circuit to rule that the 
FCC’s 2017 Order was “arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion 
within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act.”189 The petition 
asserted that the order violated “the Constitution, the Communications Act 
of 1934, as amended, and FCC regulations promulgated thereunder.” 
Additionally, the petition contended that the Order “conflict[ed] with the 
notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements of 5 U.S.C. § 553.”190 
Meanwhile, several companies and organizations, including Free 
Press, Public Knowledge, Mozilla Corporation (Mozilla), and Vimeo, Inc., 
among others, filed separate lawsuits against the FCC. Mozilla was the first 
 
 187.  The attorneys general were from New York, California, Connecticut, Delaware, 
Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Mississippi, 
as well as New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
Vermont, Virginia, and Washington. 
 188.  New York v. Fed. Comm. Comm’n, No. 18-1055 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
 189.  Id. 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. 
 190.  New York v. Fed. Comm. Comm’n, No. 18-1055. 
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to formally re-file its complaint after the FCC published its new rules and 
asserted, like the attorneys general, that the FCC “depart[ed] from its prior 
reasoning and precedent” and, therefore, “violate[d] federal law, including, 
but not limited to, the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et 
seq., as amended, and the Telecommunications Act of 1996, and FCC 
regulations promulgated thereunder.”191 Mozilla further argued that the 
2017 Order was “arbitrary, capricious, and an and an abuse of discretion 
within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et 
seq.” and, additionally, was in violation of the FCC’s statutory mandates.192 
The petition for review called on the D.C. Circuit to “hold unlawful, 
vacate, enjoin, and set aside the Order, and that it provide additional relief 
as may be appropriate.”193 
Further adding to the number of lawsuits filed against the FCC, 
INCOMPAS, a trade association whose members include streaming 
services, edge providers, and competitive carriers, such as Facebook, 
Google, and Netflix, also filed a petition for review.194 The petition, filed 
on April 23, 2018 and signed by Markham C. Erickson of Steptoe & 
Johnson LLP, asserted that INCOMPAS and its members “would be 
aggrieved” by the 2017 Order, citing evidence “where the Department of 
Justice and the FCC found—contrary to ISP assertions—that broadband 
internet access providers representing nearly 70% of residential broadband 
internet access subscribers had the incentive and ability to engage in 
behavior that threatened an open internet.”195 INCOMPAS contended that 
such evidence “[stood] in stark contrast with the Order’s newly found 
determination that ISPs lack such incentives and abilities.”196 As a result, 
the petition requested the D.C. Circuit to “hold unlawful, vacate, enjoin, 
and set aside the Order, and that it provide additional relief as may be just 
and appropriate.”197 
All the above lawsuits, including INCOMPAS’, were merged into one 
suit and were set to be heard by the D.C. Circuit, who took the case from 
the Ninth Circuit, which had been selected by the judicial lottery 
procedure.198 
 
 191.  Mozilla Corp. v. Fed. Comm. Comm’n, No. 18-1051 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
 192.  Id. 
 193.  Id. 
 194.  INCOMPAS v. Fed. Comm. Comm’n, 0:18-rev-01105 (D.C. Cir. 2018), available at 
https://www.incompas.org/Files/filings/2018/04-23-18%20INCOMPAS%20Petition%20for%20 
Review%20RIF%20Order_as%20filed.pdf.  
 195.  Id. 
 196.  Id. 
 197.  Id. 
 198.  Jon Brodkin, FCC must defend net neutrality repeal in court against dozens of litigants, 
ARS TECHNICA (March 12, 2018), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2018/03/fcc-must-defend-
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Additional State Actions 
In addition to the lawsuits filed by the states attorneys general, 
governors in six states, according to the National Conference of State 
Legislatures (NCSL), also signed executive orders limiting business 
contracts to only be with ISPs that support or practice net neutrality 
principals.199 For example, in Hawaii, Gov. David Y. Ige’s Executive Order 
No. 18-02 directed all state government agencies to only contract with ISPs 
“who demonstrate and contractually agree to support and practice net 
neutrality principles where all Internet traffic is treated equally.”200 The 
order also required state agencies to add contractual language that 
“suppliers of telecommunications, Internet, broadband, and data 
communication services shall abide by net neutrality principles,” which 
include “providing access to all lawful content and applications regardless 
of the source,” “treating all data fairly [and] . . . the same,” and refraining 
from the practices of “throttling, restricting, or prioritizing internet content, 
applications, or certain data streams.”201 
Rhode Island Gov. Gina M. Raimondo, in Executive Order 18-02;202 
New Jersey Gov. Philip D. Murphy, in Executive Order No. 9;203 New 
York, Gov. Andrew M. Cuomo, in Executive Order No. 175;204 Montana 
Gov. Steve Bullock, in Executive Order, No. 3-2018;205 and Vermont Gov. 
Philip B. Scott, in Executive Order No. 2-18,206 also required state entities 
award future contracts only to ISPs that adhere to these “net neutrality 
principles,” which generally prohibit blocking, throttling, and paid 
prioritization of lawful internet content by ISPs. 
Additionally, the NCSL reported on May 14 that net neutrality 
legislation has been introduced in 29 states, with over 65 bills introduced 
requiring internet service providers to ensure various net neutrality 
principles.207 In 13 states and Washington, D.C., 23 resolutions had been 
introduced “primarily expressing opposition to the Federal 
 
net-neutrality-repeal-in-court-against-dozens-of-litigants/. See also Dell Cameron, A Key Player 
Just Joined the Lawsuit Against the FCC to Save Net Neutrality, GIZMODO (April 24, 2018), 
https://gizmodo.com/a-key-player-just-joined-the-lawsuit-against-the-fcc-to-1825506661. 
 199.  Net Neutrality Legislation in States, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES 
(May 14, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/ 
net-neutrality-legislation-in-states.aspx. 
 200.  Hawaii Executive Order No. 18-02. 
 201.  Id. 
 202.  Rhode Island Executive Order 18-02. 
 203.  New Jersey Executive Order No. 9. 
 204.  New York Executive Order No. 175. 
 205.  Montana Executive Order, No. 3-2018. 
 206.  Vermont Executive Order No. 2-18. 
 207.  Net Neutrality Legislation in States, supra note 199. 
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Communications Commission’s (FCC) repeal of net neutrality rules; urging 
the U.S. Congress enact legislation reinstating and requiring the 
preservation of net neutrality; or stating the chamber’s support of general 
net neutrality principles.”208 
As of May 2018, two states had passed net neutrality legislation, 
including Washington, which was the first state to do so, and Oregon. On 
March 6, 2018, Washington Gov. Jay Inslee signed House Bill 2282, which 
was passed by the Washington House of Representatives on February 9 by 
a vote of 93-5 and by the state Senate on February 27 by a 35-14 vote.209 
The law first requires “[a]ny person providing broadband internet access 
service in Washington state [to] publicly disclose accurate information 
regarding the network management practices, performance characteristics, 
and commercial terms of its broadband internet access services.”210 In so 
doing, the law will “enable consumers to make informed choices regarding 
the purchase and use of such services and [to enable] entrepreneurs and 
other small businesses to develop, market, and maintain internet 
offerings.”211 
Second, the law prohibits any “person engaged in the provision of 
broadband internet access service in Washington state” from “(a) 
Block[ing] lawful content, applications, services, or nonharmful devices, 
subject to reasonable network management; (b) Impair[ing] or degrad[ing] 
lawful internet traffic on the basis of internet content, application, or 
service . . . or (c) Engag[ing] in paid prioritization.”212 The law includes 
exceptions if ISPs have an obligation or authorization “to address the needs 
of emergency communications or law enforcement, public safety, or 
national security authorities” or in cases in which the ISP regulates 
unlawful content.213 
Finally, the law covers practices and matters “vitally affecting the 
public interest for the purpose of applying the consumer protection act, 
chapter 19.86 RCW.”214 The statute states that any violation “is not 
reasonable in relation to the development and preservation of business” and 
also constitutes “an unfair or deceptive act in trade or commerce and an 
unfair method of competition” in violation of 19.86 RCW.215 
 
 208.  Id. 
 209.  An Act Relating to Protecting an Open Internet in Washington State, H.B. 2282, 65th 
Legislature (2018), available at http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2017-18/Pdf/Bills/Session 
%20Laws/House/2282-S.SL.pdf. 
 210.  Id. 
 211.  Id. 
 212.  Id. 
 213.  Id. 
 214.  Id. 
 215.  Id. 
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Like the Washington statute and the executive orders passed by six 
state governors, Oregon House Bill 4155 prohibited a public body from 
contracting “with a broadband Internet access service provider” that 
(a) Engages in paid prioritization; (b) Blocks lawful content, 
applications or services or nonharmful devices; (c) Impairs or 
degrades lawful Internet traffic for the purpose of discriminating 
against or favoring certain Internet content, applications or services 
or the use of nonharmful devices; (d) Unreasonably interferes with 
or unreasonably disadvantages an end user’s ability to select, 
access and use the broadband Internet access service or lawful 
Internet content, applications or services or devices of the end 
user’s choice; or (e) Unreasonably interferes with or unreasonably 
disadvantages an edge provider’s ability to make devices or lawful 
content, applications or services available to end users.216 
The law also required ISPs to “publicly disclose information regarding 
the provider’s network management practices and performance 
characteristics and the commercial terms of the provider’s broadband 
Internet access service sufficient for end users to verify that the service is 
provided in compliance with subsections (3) and (4) of this section.”217 The 
law contained some exceptions, including if the ISP is the “sole provider of 
fixed broadband Internet access service to the geographic location subject 
to the contract.”218 
Local Mayors 
On April 27, 2018, more than 100 mayors across the United States, 
brought together by a coalition of open internet advocates, including the 
Daily Kos, Free Press, and Demand Progress, signed a pledge to uphold net 
neutrality provisions and only contract with ISPs upholding those 
provisions, further problematizing the FCC’s decision to repeal net 
neutrality.219 The pledge begins by stating that in the last couple decades, 
“cities have increased their presence on the internet to provide information 
and services to constituents.. . . Cities have come to rely on the internet as 
an open medium with the assurance that a service provider will deliver a 
resident’s request for government content just the same as they deliver any 
 
 216.  Relating to Internet Service Providers, H.B. 4155, 79th Legislative Assembly (2018), 
available at https://olis.leg.state.or.us/liz/2018R1/Downloads/MeasureDocument/HB4155. 
 217.  Id. 
 218.  Id. 
 219.  Dell Cameron, 100 US Mayors Sign Pledge to Defend Net Neutrality Against Crooked 
ISPs, GIZMODO (April 27, 2018), https://gizmodo.com/100-us-mayors-sign-pledge-to-defend-
net-neutrality-agai-1825612839. 
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other content.”220 The pledge contended that the FCC had “violate[d] that 
principle” by passing the 2017 Order.221 
As a result, the pledge includes six steps “to ensure the internet 
remains open and to keep gatekeepers from throttling, blocking or limiting 
government content on the internet.”222 First, the mayors pledged to 
“[p]rocure applicable internet services from companies that do not block, 
throttle, or provide paid prioritization of content on sites that cities run to 
provide critical services and information to their residents.” Second, the 
mayors agreed to “[e]nsure an open internet connection with any free or 
subsidized service [they] offer to [their] residents.” Third, they agreed to 
not “block, throttle or engage in paid prioritization when providing internet 
service directly to our residents, such as through free public Wi-Fi or 
municipal broadband.” Fourth, the pledge stated that ISPs would be 
required to provide “clear and accessible notices of filtering, blocking and 
prioritization policies with enforceable penalties for violations to protect 
consumers from deceptive practices.” Fifth, the mayors agreed to 
“[m]onitor the practices of [ISPs] so consumers and regulators can know 
when a company is violating open internet principles or commitments.” 
Finally, the pledge stated that the local officials would “[e]ncourage 
consumer use of ISPs, including municipal options, that abide by open 
internet policies.223 
The campaign’s website states that the FCC’s repeal of net neutrality 
“has sparked a national movement to demand the return of real Net 
Neutrality.224 Millions of people across the political spectrum are taking 
action in the streets, at their statehouses, outside the FCC and before 
Congress.”225 Thus, the pledge suggests not only that the FCC’s decision 
was unpopular, but also that it had created confusion, complicating the 
rules and process around net neutrality. 
Congressional Action 
Further problematizing the FCC’s decision to repeal net neutrality 
before the Supreme Court could grant cert in U.S. Telecom, Sen. Edward J. 
Markey (D-Mass.) formally introduced in the U.S. Senate a resolution of 
 
 220.  Cities Open Internet Pledge, MAYORSFORNETNEUTRALITY.ORG, last accessed July 23, 
2018, https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSctOwOuAZajo8BgYGzM4l0WemNeyBFnU 
RoNWPg44971caMcuQ/viewform. 
 221.  Id. 
 222.  Id. 
 223.  Id. 
 224.  Sign to email your mayor: Save net neutrality in my city!, KOS MEDIA, last accessed 
July 23, 2018, https://actionnetwork.org/letters/sign-to-email-your-mayor-set-net-neutrality-pro 
tections-in-my-city?source=MayorsNNPledgeSWFP&referrer=group-free-press-action-fund.  
 225.  Id. 
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disapproval in an attempt to overturn the FCC’s repeal.226 The resolution, 
introduced on February 27, was proposed under the Congressional Review 
Act (CRA), which allows Congress 60 days to challenge new rules passed 
by an independent agency, such as the FCC.227 
On Jan. 15, 2018, Senate Democrats announced that they were one 
vote away from passing the resolution. In addition to all 49 Democratic 
Senators, they also had the support of Republican Sen. Susan Collins (R-
Maine).228 On May 14, Senate Democrats forced a vote on the resolution. 
On May 16, the Senate voted 52-47 in favor of the resolution, with all 49 
Democratic senators voting for the resolution, as well as three Republicans, 
including Sens. Susan Collins (R-Maine), John N. Kennedy (R-La.), and 
Lisa A. Murkowski (R-Alaska).229 
However, experts pointed out that the resolution faced a difficult 
challenge in the Republican-controlled House of Representatives, where 
passing the resolution required 150 out of 218 votes.230 As of February 
2018, only 80 Democrats, though The Daily Dot reported on April 26 that 
Rep. Mike Doyle (D-Pa.), who was leading the effort in the House, had 
gained support from 161 lawmakers, making the resolution 57 votes shy of 
passing.231 Additionally, the resolution would require President Donald 
Trump’s signature, which experts predicted was unlikely because White 
House press secretary Sarah Sanders told reporters on December 14, “The 
[Trump] administration supports the FCC’s efforts and at the same time the 
White House certainly has and always will support a free and fair 
internet.”232 
 
 226.  Brian Fung, The FCC’s vote repealing its net neutrality rules is finally official. Here’s 
what happens now, WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2018/02/22/the-fccs-net-neutrality-rules-will-die-on-april-23-heres-what-happens-no 
w/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.a480aacfdd22. 
 227.  Id. 
 228.  Cecilia Kang, Senate Democrats Push for a Net Neutrality Vote. Do They Have a 
Chance?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/16/technology/senate-
net-neutrality.html. 
 229.  Brian Fung, Senate approves bipartisan resolution to restore FCC net neutrality rules, 
WASH. POST (May 16, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/05/16/ 
net-neutrality-is-getting-a-big-vote-in-the-senate-today-heres-what-to-expect/?noredirect=on& 
utm_term=.57a8dfcd9711. 
 230.  Id. 
 231.  Andrew Wyrich, As the net neutrality CRA deadline in Congress approaches, support 
continues to grow, DAILY DOT (April 26, 2018), https://www.dailydot.com/layer8/net-neutrality-
cra-fcc/. 
 232.  White House supports FCC net neutrality vote, ‘free and fair internet’, REUTERS (Dec. 
14, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-internet-trump/white-house-supports-fcc-net-
neutrality-vote-free-and-fair-internet-idUSKBN1E82VD. 
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Regardless of the outcome of the resolution, the actions taken by 
Congressional Democrats further demonstrate the complications and 
problems arising from the FCC’s decision to repeal net neutrality while 
delaying the Supreme Court’s decision of whether it would take up the U.S. 
Telecom case. Combined with the lawsuits filed against the FCC, as well as 
legislation and other legal actions taken by state and local officials, it is 
clear that the FCC created a significant legal confusion and uncertainty by 
choosing to pass the 2017 Order and, even more significantly, delaying the 
Supreme Court’s decision. 
Conclusion 
Uncertainty is rarely an environment for good policy making and the 
FCC’s decision to delay a response in US Telecom has further complicated 
the net-neutrality issue, making a long-term resolution even less likely to 
be achieved. Although Congress may be the ultimate arbiter of the FCC’s 
authority to regulate network traffic, because of the CRA passed in the 
Senate, which has now been introduced in the U.S. House of 
Representatives, a Supreme Court decision in US Telecom would have 
provided significant guidance to the agency on its delegated powers. 
Congress has not chosen to act since the Comcast decision to provide the 
agency with a formal delegation, so a Supreme Court decision would likely 
have provided precedent and interpretation to the agency and its critics, and 
at least a legal, if not a policy, resolution. 
Descriptions of the Commission have suggested that the FCC is a 
great agency that spends all its time in court.233 The delay in US Telecom 
has provided some support for this premise. Even if the 2015 Title II 
decision were upheld by the Court, (or if the Court denied certiorari) the 
current agency could have made a policy decision to virtually repeal 
sections of the law using its enforcement discretion. Instead, the agency 
currently finds itself in court both defending the 2015 order that reviewing 
courts have already upheld twice and, ironically, defending the decision to 
repeal the 2015 order at the same time. The FCC will also be defending its 
2017 actions against a host of state laws234 dealing with net neutrality 
provisions. In these state challenges the FCC will be arguing that it did not 
have the authority to impose the 2015 regulations, at the same time it 
attempts to argue that it has the authority to overrule state provisions, like 
those being debated in California, that provide net neutrality protections. 
 
 233.  Communicators with Michael Copps and Amy Schatz, CSPAN (March 29, 2018), 
https://www.c-span.org/video/?298743-1/communicators-michael-copps-amy-schatz. 
 234.  Kaleigh Rogers, Which States Have Net Neutrality Laws?, MOTHERBOARD (April 9, 
2018), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/ywx5pw/which-states-have-net-neutrality-laws. 
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Given the number of pending cases and the length of the process 
involved, it is likely that judicial review of the 2017 decision may outlive 
the current agency and administration. If a Democratic appointee becomes 
chair of the Commission, a new agency makeup could again change course 
on net neutrality, changing course on the changed course, expanding the 
potential legal reviews. Additionally, President Trump’s nomination of 
Brett Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court further complicated net neutrality 
because Kavanaugh had already ruled in US Telecom and therefore recused 
himself from the vote to grant cert in the case, which was ultimately 
denied. Otherwise, the decision, under the previous nine-judge Supreme 
Court, may have broken along ideological lines, ruling in favor, perhaps, of 
the FCC. Instead, the FCC now faces a D.C. Circuit decision that favored 
the previous net neutrality rules. 
The agency, under Chairman Pai, had a majority of commissioners 
opposed to net neutrality, and by extension, the 2015 Title II rules. By that 
metric, it makes sense that the agency was reluctant to pursue the case. The 
agency’s initial request on November 22, 2017, for a delay in US Telecom 
was made on the same day the FCC released a draft of the order repealing 
the 2015 rules. This indicates the delay was a policy decision. 
The agency has already successfully defended the 2015 rules twice on 
judicial review. If the Court did not take the case, the 2015 rules would 
have been upheld, just as if the Court had taken the case, but ruled in favor 
of the FCC. Both of these potential outcomes were problematic for the 
agency’s approach on policy. After two wins, the majority of the 
Commission was hesitant to bet on a loss, even if that loss would have 
helped the FCC achieve its policy objectives. Yet, by not rolling the dice, 
the agency appears to have extended the battle over net neutrality for many 
years. 
 
